Abstract. To find out an optimal power allocation among users, and an optimal power pricing strategy at the Relay-assisted 5G wireless system, we propose a Variational Inequality (VI) based approach. We modeled the issues and provided an algorithm to resolve the issues, from the aspects of theoretical analysis and simulation analysis. The results indicated the VI-based solution was effective for the scenarios with both public and private budget limits.
Introduction
As the development of communication technology in wireless networks, relay technologies with a great deal of potential applications are considered as one of the hot research topics and have been studied widely in the mobile communication systems, such as the future 3GPP LTE-Advanced [1] and IEEE 802.16j [2, 3] based mobile systems. Moreover, relay transmission has obtained much attention as one of the promising transmission strategies for exploiting spatial diversity gains via single antenna nodes in wireless networks.
A variety of relay strategies have been developed over the past ten years. The simplest strategy is the analog repeater [4] . Many more advanced strategies are also used to process the received signals, such as amplify-and-forward (AF) [5] , decode-and-forward (DF) and compress-and-forward (CF). Practically, a relay station (RS) as a transmitter shares its transmission resources to repeat or forward the data from other peers, usually to the areas which are not covered by the signal of the transmitters. Hence, relays enable to expand the broadcast range of a base station (BS) beyond primary signal coverage area, or to improve involved services and performances in a part of the main coverage area where terminal devices receive poor signals due to geographic referenced constraints. In other words, with the help of the relays in wireless communication networks, the throughput performance of the whole system will be efficiently enhanced, as well as the benefits of end users (e.g., mobile terminals).
Research into cooperative communication using game theory or auction theory has become increasingly popular in recent years. Many studies have appeared in the literature, e.g. [6] . However, none of them considers the situation that the user's budget is limited for paying the relay's services, a very common situation in practice.
In this paper, to find an optimal power allocation among users, and an optimal power pricing strategy at the RS with the help of the game theory, subject to the budget limits (i.e., an upper bound of user's possible payment for the relay's service) in the multi-user relay-assisted wireless networks, we propose a Variational Inequality (VI) based approach. We modeled the issues and provided an algorithm to resolve the issues, from the aspects of theoretical analysis and simulation analysis. The results indicated the VI-based solution was effective for the scenarios with both public and private budget limits.
A Variational Inequality Approach
This section focuses on investigating an approach to resolve the issues mentioned above. Additionally, the existence and the uniqueness of the VI solution is proven, and the unique VI solution is obtained through an iterative algorithm. Numerical simulations validate the proposed scheme.
Game Theoretical Formulation
Each user with budget limit competes with others for the relay power, while the power supply at the RS is limited. In order to deal with this conflict, we apply a reimbursement mechanism, i.e., each user needs to pay for the relay power consumption. Therefore, the power allocation problem becomes a power trading game, where each user selfishly maximizes its own benefit by improving the SNR and reducing its payment for the service. In this scenario, how to allocate the relay power and how to set the power price should be taken into account. In order to answer the two mentioned questions, a game theoretical framework is applied in the power trading game and described below.
Due to the individual purpose of the buyers (i.e., users) and the seller (i.e., relay), the problem of power allocation can be formulated as a generalized Nash game (࣡), i.e., a non-cooperative power trading game with coupled constraints:
where
is is the set of the buyers, {ܲ ௦ , } ୀଵ ே denotes the set of strategies and {ܷ ௦ } ୀଵ ே is the utility functions of the buyers ࣭ , ݊ ∈ {1, … , ܰ}, respectively.
In such a non-cooperative power trading game, there are N buyers with utilities (net income, denoted as ܷ ௦ భ , ܷ ௦ మ , … , ܷ ௦ ಿ , which reflect both the QoS and the payment for relay's service and are defined as:
Observe that the first two terms of (2) correspond to the effective received SNR of ࣭ , and represent the QoS of the buyer. The last term of the equation above represents the buyer's normalized cost in purchasing the relay service given the unit price of the relay power p.
If ࣭ does not buy any power from the seller and uses the direct transmission only, i.e., ܲ ௦ , = 0, its utility is the minimum utility that ࣭ expects, expressed as
which is the guaranteed utility for the buyers if they do not participate in the power trading game. We thus have ܷ ௦ ≥ ܷ ௦ , . Note that for buyers with ܷ ௦ = ܷ ௦ , , the competition does not increase their utilities, and they will not enter the game. For the rest of the buyers, ܷ ௦ > ܷ ௦ , , they will participate in the game process. Besides, due to the relay power constraint, we have
where ܲ ௫ denotes the maximal power budget. Moreover, the expression of (4) implicates that the feasible set of each buyer depends on the rival buyers' strategies via the coupled constraint:
where ܲ ௦ , = {ܲ ௦ , } ୀଵ ே .Thus, the generalized Nash game constitutes a GNEP. Specifically, the buyers with budget constraints aim at maximizing their individual utilities by sharing the limited goods. Therefore, the GNEP can be formulated as:
Optimization and Algorithm
Since the GNEP is difficult to be solved, we formulate it as a VI problem which is addressed and solved as follows. In our approach, we consider the VI(Q, F) problem of finding a vector ܲ * ௦ , ∈ ܳ for ‫ܲ(ܨ‬ * ௦ , ) ≜ {∇ ೞ , ܷ ௦ } ୀଵ ே , which results in the following proposition. Proposition 1. The VI(Q, F) problem has a unique solution, which is also a solution of the GNEP ࣡. Thus, the ࣡ has a unique variational solution.
In order to solve the equilibrium problem, the game theoretical maximization problem has been formulated as a minimization problem as above. Therefore, given a relay power price p, this optimization problem (i.e., the buyer's best responses) can be solved analytically, and the result is given in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Given the unit relay power price p, the optimal power demand of buyer ࣭ that maximizes its utility in (2) is (7) Algorithm Description. The unique VI solution can be found by using the (PAVS) [7] , which is described in algorithm. Observe that the PAVS implies two updates in each iteration, i.e., the computation of the power allocation for a given λ that can be performed by each individual buyer and the computation of the common price λ that can be updated at the relay station. For an arbitrarily chosen but sufficiently small τ(t), the proposed algorithm converges [7] . Hence, the optimal power allocation ܲ * ௦ , for each buyer for their maximal benefits subject to the limited relay power can be finally calculated when ߣ * satisfies the termination criterion. At the same time, the algorithm stops and the couple (ܲ * ௦ , , ߣ * )
is the unique NE solution.
Simulation and Analysis

Implementation
Depended on whether or not the different users' budget information is available at the RS, two implementation scenarios are investigated, i.e., public budget limits and private budget limits. The CSI is needed in the generalized Nash game.
Public Budgets Scenario. The implementation of this scenario consists of two phases. In the first phase, the RS announces the power price p and the CSI to the users. Accordingly, the users calculate the minimal price and decide whether to participate the power trading game. In the second phase, if they will purchase some relay power at the price p, the users need report their budget limits to the RS. According to the announced price, the reported budgets and the aware CSI, the RS can calculates the final power allocation among the users via the projection algorithm and can finish the power trading game.
Private Budgets Scenario. In contrast, as private information the users' budget limits will not be informed to the RS. In this scenario, we consider λ as the power price and set p = 0 without loss of generality. Due to these settings, the user's utility-function (2) becomes the SNR and each user expects to maximize its utility by using as much relay power as possible. Moreover, all the user will participate the power trading game. Specially, the RS could dynamically adjust the power price λ during the power trading. Accordingly, the users will calculate and report how much power to buy via (7) until the optimal power price ߣ * in Algorithm is found. At this time, the limited relay power is allocated at the price ߣ * and sold out.
Simulation Results and Analysis
Consider a wireless network with six users, i.e., ࣭ , ݊ ∈ {1, … ,6}and one AF relay station, i.e., R. watt, ܲ ௫ : 1 watt. The following Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrates the simulation results in public budgets scenario () and private budgets scenario, respectively. In Figure 2 , observer that ߣ * is decreasing with the power price p and ߣ * = 0 when p ≥ 6, as well as the relationship between price and allocated power, utility, and energy-saving ratio. In Figure 3 , it shows that the RS dynamically changes the power price to find the optimal price ߣ * and the generalized Nash equilibrium. 
Summary and Future Work
A power allocation problem in multi-user relay-assisted system is studied in this paper by using a generalized Nash game, where each user with budget limit competes with each other for the power resource to maximize its individual utility function, subject to the coupled constraint of the available power. The Variational Inequality (VI) framework is applied to solve the issues of the power allocation and power pricing. The unique VI solution is proven and obtained through an iterative algorithm. Moreover, the scenarios with both public and private budget limits in the game are analyzed and simulated, and the related simulation results validate the proposed schemes. We will continue to study how the energy allocation in future heterogeneous networks based on my work [8] .
